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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1974 a new anti-avoidance provision was enacted to rep
lace the old 
section 108. The new section is our section 99. The form
er provision 
1 
was roundly condemned by both Judges and commentators 
In C.I.R. v 
2 
Gerard, McCarthy P. expressed this widely held criticism: 
The section is notoriously difficult. It cannot be given
 a literal 
application, for that would, the Commissioner has always 
agreed, 
result in avoidance of transactions which were obviously 
not aimed 
at by the section. So the Courts have had to place gloss
es on the 
statutory language in order that the bounds might be held
 reason-
ably fairly between the inland revenue authorities and tax
payers. 
But no one suggests that this is satisfactory, especially
 as one 
result has been that the Privy Council has been forced in
 a number 
of cases to assume the task, rightly one for the Legislatu
re, of 
providing the tests according to which people are taxed. 
Although section 99 has been on our statute books for ove
r six years now, 
it has not been considered by the courts yet. As a resul
t the exact 
extent of its application has not been decided and whethe
r it corrects 
all the defects of its predecessor is far from clear. Se
ction 99, 
although far more detailed, has retained key phrases from 
the old section. 
There are also important new words and definitions, and a 
new power of 
reconstruction has been given to the Commissioner once a p
articular 
"arrangement" is declared void. 
There are, therefore, important questions about the new se
ction that need 
to be answered as to the extent the new section changes th
e old and, if 
any, the result of those changes. Also, as some words and
 phrases of 
1 I will refer to the new section as section 99 and the old 
section 
as section 108. 
2 [ 19 7 4] 2 N. Z. L. R. 2 79, 2 80. 
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2 
section 108 have been retained, how relevant are the glos
ses the courts 
adopted in relation to the old section? 
From the taxpayers point of view it remains important for
 him to be able 
to know whether a particular transaction will be regarded 
as legitimate 
or as tax avoidance. The clarity of the legislature's inte
ntion as to 
what should be caught and what should not is crucial. 
In his dissenting judgement in Mangin v C.I.R.
3 
Lord Wilberforce stated 
four fundamental flaws with the old section, namely: 
i) It failed to define the nature of the liability to ta
x,avoidance 
of which is attacked. 
ii) It failed to specify any circumstances in which arran
gements which 
had fiscal consequences might not be caught by the section
. 
iii) It failed to specify the relationship between the sec
tion and other 
sections of the Act under which tax advantages might have 
been 
obtained. 
iv) It failed to provide for "reconstruction" once the ar
rangement had 
become void.
4 
It is important that the new section overcomes these criti
cims if it is 
to be regarded as successful. It is the purpose of this p
aper to see how 
the new section would probably be interpreted when it does
 come before 
the courts and to see how successful it is as an attempt t
o rectify the 
criticisms that were directed at its predecessor. 
3 [ 1971] N.Z.L.R.591. 
4 Ibid 602. 
3 
II. I N T E R P R E T I N G T H E S E C T I O N 
The principal rule of statutory interpretation is the lite
ral rule which 
requires the statute's intention to be determined by the w
ords alone 
given their neutral and ordinary meaning. This approach 
is to be departed 
5 
from only when the literal interpretation is unreasonable
. 
The starting point when interpreting section 99 should be wi
th the words 
alone, independent from the old cases on section 108 giving t
hem their 
natural and ordinary meaning.
6 
The question, then, is whether it is clear from the words 
the type of 
arrangement that will be caught. Section 99 includes new de
finitions of 
central concepts, but when these are closely examined it 
can be seen that 
they are very wide and vague and in fact do not define an
ything. 
"Arrangement" is defined in the section as meaning: 
any contract, agreement, plan, or understanding (whether e
nforce-
able or unenforceable) including all steps and transaction
s by 
which it is carried into effect. 
"Contract" would appear to be used in its strict legal sen
se since the 
definition also includes "agreement". "Agreement" is defi
ned in the 
Oxford Dictionary as:
7 
an arrangement between two or more persons as to a course 
of 
action ; a mutual understanding. 
"Plan" is defined as "a scheme of arrangement". 
"Understanding" is defined as: 
5 
6 
7 
I.R.C . v Luke [1963] A.C.557. 
Barrell v Fordree [1932] A.C. 676. 
All definitions in this paper will be from The Oxford Eng
lish 
Dictionary, Clarendon Press Oxford (1933). 
4 
A mutual arrangement or agreement of an informal but more
 or less 
explicit kind. 
"Arrangement" is defined as: 
a structure or combination of things arranged in a particu
lar way 
or for any purpose. 
As can be seen, these words in no way qualify the word "a
rrangement", 
but rather indicate that it is to be understood in its wi
dest possible 
sense. The addition of "whether enforceable or unenforce
able" seems 
slightly superfluous given the wide language already used
, but it rein-
forces the conclusion that very little that produces some 
change in a 
person's circumstances could escape a literal interpretati
on of the 
definition. 
"Liability" is defined in this section as including "a po
tential or 
prospective liability in respect of future income:" A po
tential 
liability is a possible liability. There is no indication
 what degree 
of possibility is required. As Lord Wilberforce put it, h
ow hypothetical 
may this liability be? Is it "probably might or ordinaril
y might or 
conceivably might?
118 
Similarly, the definition of "tax avoidance" in Section 99 is 
so wide as 
to be totally unhelpful. This includes: 
a) Directly or indirectly altering the incidence of any 
income tax. 
b) Directly or indirectly relieving any person from any 
liability to 
pay income tax. 
c) Directly or indirectly avoiding, reducing, or postpon
ing any 
liability to income tax. 
Again some of the words used seem superfluous. Presumably
 to avoid tax 
8 Mangin v C.I.R. Ll971] N.Z.L.R. 591, 602. 
5 
a person must lessen the amount o
f tax he is paying. Thus it is d
ifficult 
to see how a person can alter his
 income tax without reducing it. 
Similarly how can a person reduce
 his income tax liability without
 
relieving himself of it, or reliev
e himself of his liability withou
t 
altering it? The definition seem
s to cover every conceivable situ
ation 
where a person's incidence of tax
 is diminished rather than indica
ting 
the type of situation that the se
ction will r e gard as tax avoidanc
e. 
By including in the definition bo
th the words "altering" and "avoi
dance" 
the section gives no indication o
f any situation where a person's 
incidence of tax can be altered 
without being labelled as "avoida
nce". 
Furthermore, the inclusion in a d
efinition of tax avoidance, "avoi
ding 
income tax" seems to be self defe
ating since that begs the questio
n. 
Thus, the definitions in section 
99 are no more than "catch all" c
lauses 
which achieve no purpose other th
an daunting one at the possible s
cope 
of the section. You are left wit
h the main body of the section to
 
determine the actual boundaries o
f the section. 
One significant aspect of the new
 definition of "avoidance" is the
 in-
clusion of "postponing" liability
 to pay tax as avoidance. This i
s 
an extension of the old section a
nd it is acknowledgement of the f
act 
that tax postponed is tax saved. 
The new section extends the princ
iple 
of avoidance to situations where 
derivation has been postponed and
 income 
has not yet even arisen. 
The main provision in section 99 
is subsection (2) which reads: 
Every arrangement made or entered
 into, whether before or after 
the commencement of this Act, sha
ll be absolutely void as against 
the Commissioner for income tax p
urposes if and to the extent that
, 
directly or indirectly, -
a) Its purpose or effect is tax
 avoidance; or 
b) Where it has 2 or more purpo
ses or effects, one of its 
purposes or effects (not being a 
merely incidental purpose or 
6 
effect) is tax avoidance, whether or not any other or others 
of its purposes or effects relate to, or are referable to, 
ordinary business or family dealings, -
whether or not any person affected by that arrangement is a party 
thereto. 
The critical questions in respect of this provision are: how do you 
determine what the "purpose or effect" of an arrangement is; whether it 
has more than one "purpose or effect"; or whether a "purpose or effect" 
is "merely incidental"? The purpose of an arrangement is the "object 
for which it was made or for which it exists".
9 
All the definitions of "purpose" in the Oxford Dictionary involve an 
intention, a mental element. The fact that the section refers to the 
arrangements 's "purpose" cannot change that. A mental element is still 
involved and must be that of the person who put the arrangement into 
being. As Lord Devlin stated in Chandler v DPP, "a purpose must exist 
in the mind. It cannot exist anywhere else". lO How is this intention to 
be determined? There are two possible ways. Firstly, you could look 
solely at the arrangement and determine the taxpayer's intention from 
the objective facts of the arrangement. Alternatively you could try to 
ascertain his subjective intention, his motive. 
There is little doubt that the courts will continue to determine the 
intention from the objective facts of an arrangement, even though this 
involves giving the terms "purpose" and "effect" a synonomous meaning. 
The New Zealand courts have consistently taken this approach with regard 
to section 108 and it is an interpretation that is supported by the fact 
that section 99 refers to the arrangement's "purpose or effect" not that 
of the taxpayer. 
9 The Oxford English Dictionary; supra n. 7. 
10 (I962] 3 All E.R. 142, 155. 
7 
The section catches all arrangements which have one of its purposes as 
tax avoidance, provided that purpose is not a "merely incidental purpose". 
Therefore the whole scope of this section turns on the word "incidental". 
What is an "incidental" purpose? Incidental is defined as: 
Occurring or liable to occur in fortuitous or subordinate con-
junction with something else of which it forms no essential part. 
If an objective test is adopted then an arrangement will not have a 
fortuitous purpose; (that which happens accidentally). The purpose is 
what in fact is achieved. Subordinate is defined as, "of inferior 
importance, not principal or predominate; secondary; minor". 
To establish that a purpose of tax avoidance was only a "subordinate" 
purpose involves establishing that there was another purpose which was 
the "essential", "predominate" or "principal" purpose; which was not 
a tax avoidance purpose. Before you can establish that the essential 
purpose of an arrangement is something other than tax avoidance, you 
need to know what constitutes tax avoidance. You need to know what type 
of purposes can exist; which have the effect of diminishing a person's 
tax liability without necessarily being labelled tax avoidance. 
The Act clearly envisages that a person is able to transfer property 
to other persons, to trusts or to companies, and that such adjustments 
will have tax consequences. However, neither section 99, nor the Act 
generally, provides any framework from which it can be established what 
is a legitimate reduction and what is going to be regarded as tax avoid-
ance. 
As we have seen, the definition of "tax avoidance" is totally unhelpful. 
Establishing such a framework is essential before you can determine what 
the purpose of a particular transaction is. 
It is precisely for this reason that section 108 was criticised and why 
8 
courts were forced to place glosses over the words, That section could 
not operate without basic assumptions being made as to what was legitimate 
and what was avoidance. The courts were forced to look beyond the sections 
of the Act to establish these assumptions. The test they applied was 
that "ordinary business and family dealings" incurred legitimate tax 
reduction. Anything that went beyond that was avoidance. Clearly there 
are just as many problems defining what is an "ordinary business and 
family dealing" and this is the reason why that test has been so vague 
and as a result criticised. However, the courts are again going to be 
forced to look beyond the words of the section to establish when tax 
reduction will be regarded as legitimate and when it will be regarded 
as avoidance. 
9 
III. THE APPLICATION OF THE ORDINARY FAMILY AND 
BUSINESS DEALINGS TEST 
It will not be possible for the courts to interpret section 99 purely by 
reference to the words used, as argued in the earlier section. Therefore 
it becomes necessary to examine how the courts will interpet it and in 
particular whether they will adopt the approach used in the cases con-
cerned with interpreting section 108. It would seem that the legislature 
by choosing to retain the words and phrases of the old section and by 
adopting words and phrases used by the Judges in interpreting the old 
section could have intended the interpretations of those old cases to 
apply. 
The basic test which the courts practically substituted for the words 
of the section was first established in Newton 
11 
V F.C.T. That case 
was concerned with the Australian equivalent of our section 99 but the 
test laid down by Lord Denning was subsequently adopted by our courts. 
Th L d D . 
d 12 
ere or enning state : 
In order to bring the arrangement within the section you must be 
able to predicate - by looking at the overt acts by which it was 
implemented - that it was implemented in that particular way so as 
to avoid tax. If you cannot so predicate, but have to acknowledge 
that the transactions are capable of explanation by reference to 
ordinary business or family dealing, without necessarily being 
labelled as a means to avoid tax, then the arrangement does not 
come within the section. • 
In applying this test to section 99 the Privy Council has redefined it 
in three different ways. In Mangin Lord Donovan stated: 
13 
11 [1958] 2 All E. R. 759. 
12 Ibid, 764. This test is commonly known as the "Predication" test. 
13 [1971] N.Z.L.R. 591, 598. 
10 
"Their Lordships think that what this phrase refers to is . . • 'a 
scheme •.. devised for the sole purpose, or at least the principal 
purpose, [ of tax avoidance]'." 
/ ,,.,,, 
/' 
14 
In Aston v C.I.R. Viscount Dilhorne set out to restate the test in 
Mangin but in the process established a totally different test. He 
stated that where one of the purposes was tax avoidance then the arrange-
ment is caught by section 99, and "it matters not what the other 
15 
purposes and effects it might have". 
16 
As one commentator states: 
His judgement was that, where a taxpayer effects an arrangement for 
any purpose which results in tax saving [the taxpayer] is presumed 
to have intended that result and the section operates. 
A third test was set out by Lord Diplock in Europa Oil (NZ) Ltd. v 
17 
C.I.R.(2): 
" ... the section in any case does not strike down transactions which 
do not have as their main purpose or one of their main purposes tax 
avoidance. It does not strike down ordinary business or commercial 
transactions which incidentally result in some saving of tax. 
It is certainly far from certain that the Newton test is going to remain 
as the basis for determining the scope of section 99. As J.Bassett 
1 
. 18 
exp ains: 
14 (19 7 5) 2 N. Z. T. C. 61, 0 30. 
15 Ibid, 61, 035. 
16 G.Harley "The Privy Council's new approach to section 108". (1976) 
N.Z.L.J. 33, 36. 
17 (!97~ N.Z.L.R. 546, 556. 
18 J.Bassett "Estate 
Estate Planning: 
R.A.Green. Price 
4, 8. 
Plans and arrangements to avoid income tax". 
selected aspects and developments edited by 
Milburn for Victoria University Press (1979), 
This 
11 
... by section 99's expanding the basis upon which the application 
of the former section proceeded so that ordinary family or business 
dealings may now be within the preview of the section, it might now 
be thought that the predication test itself is no longer the 
correct approach to take in the administration of the section. 
19 
is the view taken by L. McKay He states: 
First, that test was redefined in Mangin v C.I.R. - by the Privy 
Council - in terms which are difficult to square with the notion 
forwarded in S. 108(l)(b) to the effect that a minor purpose 
of tax avoidance will suffice even though the principal purpose 
is ordinary business or family dealing. Clearly a redefinition 
by the Privy Council again? - is called for to accommodate the 
amendment's change of emphasis. Secondly, as Lord Wilberforce has 
suggested, the test is an extremely difficult one to administer. 
Certainly it is insufficiently precise to remove, even sub-
stantially, the margin for judicial predilection. And thirdly, 
it would not be surprising if the Commissioner were to litigate the 
applicability of the criterion - redefined or otherwise - under the 
new provision. It is, clearly, judicial legislation which 
severely limits the literal ambit of the statutory language. 
It can be seen that the words of the section do not allow the Mangin test 
to apply. But, as has been shown, that test has subsequently been 
changed on two occasions by the Privy Council. The latest test laid 
down by the Privy Council is the "one of the main purposes" tests in 
Europa(2). 
This "main purposes" test is an appropriate test to use in respect to 
section 99. From its definition, "Incidental" can be seen as an 
19 "Section 108 and the issue of legislative propriety" (1976) 
N.Z.L.J. 238, 244. 
12 
antonym for "Main". An incidental purpose is a "subordinate", "inferior" 
20 
and "minor" purpose. This is exactly the distinction the courts were 
trying to establish under section 108. In Elmiger v C.I.R. decided 
before the more restrictive test of Mangin was imposed, Woodhouse J. said 
that the purpose of tax avoidance had to be one of the "activating 
purposes of the transaction ... a goal in itself and not arising as a 
natural incident of some other purpose
11
•
21 
In Europa (2) itself, Lord Diplock specifically used the term "incidental" 
22 
in contrast to the "main" purpose. He stated: 
[ The sectio~ does not strike down ordinary business or 
commercial transactions which incidentally result in some saving 
of tax ...• In such cases the avoidance of tax will be incidental 
to and not the main purpose of the transaction or transactions 
which will be the achievement of some business or commercial 
object. 
I accept McKay's second criticism that it is a test that is far too wide 
and uncertain. However, although the test severely limits the literal 
ambit of the statutory language this is necessary if the section is to 
have any practical operation. The section cannot be given a sensible 
meaning without reference to some broader notion of what constitutes 
legitimate tax reduction. If this test was not adopted, some other 
would have to be. No other test suggests itself, and as the language 
of the section itself seems to have been intentionally similar to the 
old section, it seems to be applicable. The inclusion of the phrase 
"whether or not any other or others of its purposes or effects relate 
to, or are referable to, ordinary business or family dealings", - in 
section 99(2) seems to make the "ordinary business or family dealings" 
20 From the definition of "incidental" and "subordinate". 
21 =1966] in N.Z.L.R. 683, 694. 
22 [ 1976 j N.Z.L.R. 546, 556. 
13 
test redundant. But when it is understood how the section applies this 
phrase actually supports the contrary conclusion. The section is not 
rejecting the relevance of whether there was a business purpose or a 
family dealing purpose. What the section is saying is that where there 
is a tax avoidance purpose which is not an "incidental" one, then the 
"tax avoidance purpose" is an independent purpose and not a necessary 
consequence of any other purpose. The arrangement is caught on that 
ground. This is precisely what was stated in Elmiger by Woodhouse J. 
He stated:
23 
Accordingly it is my opinion that 'family or business dealings'will 
be caught by S. 108 despite their characterisation as such, 
if there is associated with them the additional purpose or effect 
of tax relief (in the sense contemplated by the section) pursued as 
a goal in itself and not arising as a natural incident of some 
other purpose. 
By using the words "whether or not", section 99 indicates that an ordi-
nary business or damily dealing is an independent and legitimate purpose. 
Therefore, the inclusion of that phrase gives strong support for the 
view that the basis for determining whether there has been tax avoidance 
is still going to be whether the arrangement achieves a "ordinary 
business or family dealing" purpose. 
23 [}966] N.Z.L.R. 683, 694. 
14 
IV. WHAT EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE THE PURPOSE 
OF AN ARRANGEMENT? 
Despite the severe criticism of the predication test, it would appear 
that the courts will again be forced to adopt it to give any sensible 
meaning to section 99. Unfortunately by retaining this test we are again 
faced with the problems inherent in the use of such vague concepts. How 
do you determine what is an ordinary business or family arrangement from 
an extraordinary one? It is not a determination that is self evident, 
or where a person can point to specific factors which constitute an 
ordinary transaction. The nature of the test requires a subjective 
determination by the courts as to what constitutes an ordinary business 
or family dealing. 
24 
The cases on section 108 are of limited assistance in this respect 
since the courts have not been able to lay down any criteria and have 
in fact been inconsistent in their application of the test. The problem 
is further exacerbated by the fact that the new words in the section 
have got to be considered when applying this test. 
The courts have consistently stated that the purpose of an arrangement 
is to be determined objectively from the arrangement and that the purpose 
is what the arrangement effects. However, there is confusion as to how 
far beyond the actual terms of an arrangement a court may look to help 
determine that purpose. 
The Privy Council in Newton stated that to determine the objective pur-
pose of an arrangement the court had to look at the "overt acts by 
which it was implemented". 
24 To avoid unnecessary confusion, I will regard the old cases as 
discussing section 99 and refer to section 108 only when it is 
necessary to distinguish the two sections. 
15 
25 
In the case of McKay v C.I.R. Turner J. in interpreting the test 
stated:
26 
But [).tl is not to be read as meaning that once the existence and 
terms of an arrangement are proved nothing else but the facts of 
its implementation may be looked at to see whether the arrange-
ment offends against the section, ... 
Turner J. then looked at two previous transactions which had been entered 
into by the taxpayer but had later been rescinded because they had been 
declared void by the Commissioner under section 99. Those two trans-
actions were completely independent of the transactions actually in 
dispute. Turner J. nevertheless considered them relevant. 
27 
He stated: 
I think that the background provided by the 1963 transactions and 
by their rescission and the actual terms and effect of the 1966 
transactions themselves, with the theme of income tax insistently 
recurring at every turn, are abundantly sufficient to bring these 
transactions plainly within [section 99 ] . 
The relevance of those previous transactions is suspect if the purpose 
of an arrangement is to be ascertained from seeing what an arrangement 
effects. 
28 
As one commentator comments; 
If the judges allow their interpretation of a separate and 
objectively valid arrangement to be influenced to a marked degree 
by inferences drawn from the taxpayer's past activities, then it 
is suggested that they are getting very near to deciding the case 
on the basis of the 'motive'. 
2 5 Ll- 9 7 3] N . Z • L • R • 5 9 2 • 
26 Ibid 598. 
27 Idem. 
28 B.Hansen "Family Trusts - 'normal dealing' or 'tax avoidance'" 
Vol.5 N.Z.U.L.R. 377, 379. 
16 
29 
The Court of Appeal in Martin v C.I.R. found the taxpayer's motive as 
decisive in determining the purpose of the arrangement. This can be 
seen from the following statement made by McCarthy P. when he was dis-
cussing evidence put by the taxpayer's lawyer, Mr Bradshaw: 
30 
Whilst there cannot be any doubt about the reliability of Mr 
Bradshaw's evidence, the fact that Mr Bradshaw saw the scheme he 
proposed as desirable in the interests of the appellant does not 
mean that those purposes which influenced his thinking were the 
ones that ultimately the appellant had in mind when he entered 
into the [arrangement]. 
The courts, then, have looked at the motive as relevant regardless of 
the fact that the Privy Council in Newton stated that it was an irrelevant 
consideration under the predication test. 
The Privy Council most recently declared motive to be irrelevant in the 
case of Ashton. 
31 
But in Halliwell v C.I.R. decided subsequently by 
the Supreme Court in 1977 motive was again regarded as a consideration. 
C J h • d • h I • d 
d 32 asey . w en cons1 er1ng t e taxpayers ev1 ence, state : 
With respect, I find his account of his concern about Mr Kotoul's 
seniority and status unconvincing as a reason for setting up this 
arrangement. 
Another aspect that the courts have in the past regarded as significant 
is the conduct of the parties once they have put their arrangements into 
effect. In Elmiger North P. thought it was significant that "there 
was no change in the practical operation of the partnership business: ... 
1133 
29 (1973) N.Z.T.C. 61, 067. 
30 Ibid, 61, 069. 
31 (1977) 3 N.Z.T.C. 61, 208. 
32 Ibid, 61, 210. 
33 Q.967] N.Z.L.R. 161, 179 (CA). 
17 
34 
Similarly in the case of Marx v C.I.R. the court was influenced by 
the fact that the arrangement the re did not change how the taxpayers in 
that case contributed to the productivity or eve n how they operated their 
35 
bank account. 
However, in Ashton, Viscount Dilhorne stated:
36 
If an arrangement has a particular purpose, then that will be its 
intended effect. If it has a particular effect, then that will be 
its purpose and oral evidence to show that it has a different 
purpose or different effect to that which is shown by the arrange-
ment itself is irrelevant to the determination of the question 
whether the arrangement has or purports to have ·the purpose or 
effect of in any way altering the incidence of income tax or 
relieving any person from his liability to pay income tax. 
When considering the effect of this decision by the Privy Council, I.C.F. 
S 1 
. 37 
pry c aims: 
... these statements should not be construed as justifying a view 
that in applying tax avoidance provisions the arrangement in 
question must be analysed in isolation. On any view an arrange-
ment can be properly understood, and its effects ascertained, 
only by analysing it by reference to all the facts and matters to 
which it relates in accordance with general evidentiary 
principles. 
On the contrary it is difficult to construe the Privy Council's decision 
in any other way but that the terms of an arrangement are to be looked 
at in isolation. It is an unequivocal statement from the Privy Council 
34 [i.970] N.Z.L.R. 182. 
35 Ibid 192 per North P. 
36 (1975) N.Z.T.C. 61, 030, 61, 034. 
37 "A recent Privy Council decision on tax avoidance" (1975) Australian 
Tax Review, 220, 221. 
18 
that the purpose of an arrangement is detennined only by reference to the 
tenns of the arrangement and the purpose is what those terms of the 
arrangement effect. 
Therefore if the tenns of an arrangement have the effect of a tax saving 
the taxpayer is presumed to have taxsaving as a purpose and the only 
question that remains is whether that purpose was a "main" or an 
"incidental" purpose of the arrangement. 
This is a much narrower application of the predication test than has 
previously been adopted by the courts. It means that the courts will 
need to specifically state what constitutes the terms of each arrange-
ment. The definition of "arrangement" in the section is far too wide 
to be of any help. There is no indication of what constitutes a "plan" 
or an "understanding", and these will be questions that will take on 
critical importance. 
The cases before Ashton are of limited assistance since the courts were 
not concerned with distinguishing the terms of the arrangement from the 
more general surrounding circumstances. But they perhaps indicate that 
the New Zealand courts will take a fairly liberal approach as to what 
they do consider to be a tenn of an arrangement due to the wide range 
of factors that have been considered relevant in determining the purpose 
of an arrangement. This must also be so due to the nature of the 
inquiry. A 1 
. 38 
s Spry c aims: 
38 
It is contrary to both ordinary expectations and to legal practice 
to attempt to determine the nature of an act or omission without 
reference to the circumstances in which it is found and to which 
it relates. This must be so in particular when it is being 
attempted to establish the purpose that should be attributed to 
the material act or omission. 
Section 260 of the Income Tax Assessment Act (Australia) (2 Ed, the 
Law Book Company Ltd, Sydney, 1976) 40. 
19 
39 
Thus, as A. Molloy states: 
while those purposes must be ascertained from the terms of the 
arrangement, the latter, or some of them, may have to be inferred 
from all the circumstances of the case. And it is apparent -
as witness the judgment in Loader v C.I.R. - that the courts 
tend to consider the motives of the parties as part of the 
circumstances. 
There is, therefore, a lot of uncertainty in what will be allowed as 
evidence to prove the terms of an arrangement. 
It is also evident that with a taxpayer who has a more formal format to 
his arrangement, it will be harder to claim that informal conduct on 
his part should be considered as part of the terms of the arrangement. 
We could then have a strange situation where in two almost identical 
situations we have different results merely because one arrangement 
was more formally drafted than the other. 
There is also confusion as to how much attention the courts will pay to 
this direction by the Privy Council in Ashton. In the subsequent case, 
Halliwell, the Supreme Court seems to have ignored this direction to 
look only at the terms of the arrangement and also the more specific 
statement that conduct subsequent to the arrangement is not to be 
relevant. 
40 
In that case Casey J. stated: 
39 
40 
I am satisfied that physically, Mr Kotoul carried on under 
the new arrangements no differently from what he had done under 
the partnership ..•. I am satisfied that the Trustees had no real 
say about his employment. It would be unrealistic to suggest 
that ultimate practical control over Mr Kotoul and his work 
rested with anyone other than M~ Halliwell. 
Molloy on Income Tax (Butterworths, 1976) 569. 
( 19 77) 3 N. Z. T. C. 61, 20 8, 61 , . 210. 
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The Judge is obviously taking regard of factors that he sees as 
separate from the arrangement itself and which concern the conduct of 
the parties subsequent to the actual arrangement being set up. 
21 
V. WHAT ARRANGEMENTS ARE CAUGHT? 
The cases are very unhelpful when it comes to trying to elucidate from 
them what factors will cause an arrangement to fail to be classified 
as an "ordinary business or family dealing". The court's approach to 
a family dealing is much the same as it is toward a business dealing, 
with slightly more latitude allowed because of the personal nature of 
the arrangement. 
41 
This is well explained in Tayles v C.I.R. where 
Jeffries J. stated:
42 
In a dealing within a family it is common to find tempered the 
strict mercantile rules that are current in the market place. 
The modifications range from unalloyed generosity to slight 
mitigation of the strict rules . . . • [Thus] tempering, some risk, 
and some amelioration are acceptable in a family dealing, but not 
abandonment of commercial practice, apparent mercantile foolish-
ness or market artificiality. 
He however also states that the court is not able to give definite 
limits to the notion of "ordinary family business" and that they can 
43 
only decide on each particular case. This is the problem the courts 
have with the whole test. 
There are however, a few factors which the courts have recurringly 
pointed to as relevant: 
1) Control 
The fact that the taxpayer retained effective control over the property 
in Elmiger was seen as an important factor indicating that the trans-
action could not be seen as an ordinary family arrangement. There two 
brothers in partnership sold machinery to a family trust set up by their 
41 !}97 -U N.Z.L.R. 668. 
42 Ibid 6 78. 
43 Idem. 
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father. The trust hired the machinery back to the taxpayer. The 
taxpayers tried to deduct the cost of bailment against their income. 
The court held that this arrangement was void. One of the main reasons 
being that there was no change in the practical operation of the 
partnership business. 
44 
However, this was not found to be very relevant in Loader v C.I.R. 
There the taxpayer, an earth moving contractor, incorporated his 
business and sold his equipment to a family trust set up by his father. 
The company hired the equipment back. The court held that since the 
taxpayer was controlling the property in a different capacity it was 
45 
irrelevant that he had the same control. Cooke J. stated: 
In any event the fact that trust and company were designed to and 
did work hand-in-glove, and doubtless under the effective control 
of the objector, does not mean that the arrangement was princi-
pally a tax avoidance device ...• the separate legal identities of 
company and shareholders and the separate legal existence of 
trusts are everyday elements in business and family dealings. 
Although the arrangement in Loader was a lot more sophisticated than 
the one in Elmiger, the principle should be the same in both. If the 
company and the trust in Loader are to be accepted as two distinct 
entities for tax purposes, without regard to who actually controls the 
trust property, so should the trust and taxpayer in Elmiger. Further, 
the explanation that was accepted in Loader was that the arrangement 
was desirable 
to stabilise the objector's estate for duty purposes in the event 
of his death, and to transfer the more valuable income earning 
assets so that they would not be assets at risk in the 
business. 
44 [197~ 2 N.Z.L.R. 473. 
45 Ibid 4 78. 
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This explanation applies equally to both situations. The approaches in 
Loader and Elmiger are inconsistent with each other. This does not help 
when trying to apply the cases to interpret the new section. 
2) Nature of Income Producing Activity 
46 
In the case Udny v C.I.R. the taxpayer sold a hay bailer and a hay 
conditioner to a family trust. The taxpayer continued to operate his 
harvesting business as before, except that he was earning the money for 
the trust and the only compensation he got was free use of the machines 
to harvest his own hay. Wild C.J. held that the machinery was playing 
only a minor role in generating the income. He stated:
47 
In truth the farm implements were useless without motive power and 
human labour. On the evidence I find it quite clear that the real 
power generating the income in question has been the exertions of 
the objector himself. 
However, it would be wrong to regard the fact that machinery needs an 
operator to work it as meaning it has no value in itself as income 
producing. It does have an income earning capacity in its rental 
potential. This was implicit in the decision of Loader. The nature of 
the property is only one factor that is to be taken into account in con-
junction with the rest of the circumstances, and it may or may not be 
relevant depending on how the whole arrangement works. It is not useful 
looking at it as an isolated factor. 
3) The Term or Life of the asset transferred 
It was considered relevant in Mangin that a paddock was transferred for 
one year at a time and that a different paddock was used each year being 
the one which was being used to grow the wheat in that particular year. 
Similarly, in Elmiger, the fact that the property would revert back to 
46 J}97~ N.Z.L.R. 714. 
47 Ibid 717. lA W L!SR~.RY 
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the taxpayer was considered indicative of the arrangement being out-
side the range of an ordinary family arrangement, 
The cases do show that a short term transfer of assets or the transfer 
of a quickly wasting asset are matters to be taken into account. But 
they have not required that it is essential that either aspect be 
absent for an arrangement to be acceptable under the predication test. 
Rather, the cases suggest that the courts should look at the impact that 
the arrangement has on the taxpayer's affairs. 
48 
As Bassett claims: 
Plainly }he court'~ analysis does not postulate the absence of 
an "enduring benefit" as the pivotal notion upon which application 
of the section proceeds. Rather it is in the notion that the 
arrangement merely alters the disponer's tax burden without any 
noticeable change in the conduct of his affairs that the courts 
find an unacceptable degree of artificiality in the impugned 
arrangement. 
Therefore, although it is possible to point to these individual factors 
that the courts have considered as significant in the past, the courts 
make it clear that because of the very nature of the test, the import-
ance of these factors will vary. 
They will vary depending on their significance, as the courts see it, 
in the whole scheme of the arrangement. It is also important to note 
that although the courts have indicated specifically that these aspects 
are relevant, it is by no means certain that there are no other factors 
that they will regard as indicating a tax avoidance purpose. Thus a 
taxpayer can be wary of allowing any of these factors mentioned from 
being included in any arrangement he initiates, but it is not possible 
for him to know the precise scope of the section. 
48 "Estate plans and arrangements to avoid income tax", supra n. 18, 
16. 
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VI. N E W S O U R C E S I N C O M E 
Section 108 only applied to arrangements that affected "existing" 
sources of income and not those that were set up in relation to "new" 
income sources. This distinction was first established by the Privy 
Council in Europa(2) where Lord Diplock stated that the application of 
49 
the section 
... presupposes the continued receipt by the taxpayer of income 
from an existing source in respect of which his liability to pay 
tax would be altered or relieved if legal effect were given to 
the contract, agreement or arrangement sought to be avoided as 
against the Commissioner. The section does not strike at new 
sources of income or restrict the right of the taxpayer to 
arrange his affairs in relation to income from a new source in 
such a way as to attract the least possible liability to tax. 
It is very unfortunate that section 99 does not state whether this dis-
tinction between "new" and "existing" sources of income should continue. 
It would have been so easy for the Legislature to have done so and by 
so doing they would have eliminated any uncertainty. 
On the grounds of policy there is no justification for this distinction. 
Whether a taxpayer sets up an arrangement that directs income into a 
trust before he organises the source of income or whether he does it 
afterwards should be irrelevant. It is difficult to see why the 
timing should change the purpose of the arrangement. 
The question, however, is whether the words of section 99 are wider than 
those of section 108 to allow new sources of income to be covered as 
well. 
49 fi97fil N.Z.L.R. 546, 556. 
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Section 99 contains new definitions, one of them being that of "liability". 
That is defined as including "a potential or prospective liability". But 
it is difficult to see how this definition could extend the section to 
cover new sources of income since it would not be possible to know if 
a taxpayers incidence of tax had been reduced by an arrangement unless 
the potential to pay existed before the taxpayer entered into the arrange-
ment . 
50 
As one commentator states: 
.. . it is impossible to alter the incidence of tax, relieve one's 
self from liability to pay tax, or avoid income tax assessed from 
a source of income never held by the taxpayer. The section con-
templates a change in position and a basis for comparison. A new 
source gives neither. 
Subsection (3) of section 99 uses language that would clearly cover both 
existing and new source income. There the Commissioner in reconstructing 
an arrangement is able to take account of the income. 
a) That person would have, or might be expected to have, or would in 
all likelihood have, derived if that arrangement had not been made 
or entered into; or 
b) That person would have derived if he had been entitled to the 
benefit of all income, or of such part thereof as the 
Commissioner considers proper, derived by any other person or 
persons as a result of that arrangement. 
But this subsection only comes into operation once an "arrangement" is 
void in accordance with subsection (2). Thus it would not be correct 
to use subsection (3) to help interpret subsection (2). 
As a result the distinction between new sources and existing sources will 
most likely continue under section 99. 
50 G.Hartley "The Europa Oil(No.2)Ltd Case" (1976) N.Z.L.J. 218, 
227. 
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When the test was first introduced in Europa(2) Lord Diplock made no 
attempt to explain what income would be regarded as new source income. 
The only other case where a New Zealand court has addressed the question 
of new source income is in the case of Halliwell. Casey J. held that the 
fact that Mr Halliwell bought out his father's share in their partner-
ship did not amount to creating a new source of income. He made the 
following observation:
51 
The interest a partner may have can vary from an insignificant 
share of the profits on the one hand, to virtually total ownership 
of the capital and profits on the other, and the amount of work 
he does can also be as varied. If the former acquires sole 
ownership of the business, it is unrealistic to describe him as 
merely continuing an existing source of income. If the latter 
did so, the opposite description could be equally unreal. 
Casey J. held that Mr Halliwell's position fell into the latter 
situation and prescribed the following test to help determine the issue:
52 
I think the answer to the question of whether there is an existing 
or a new source of income (to which the arrangement under attack 
relates) depends on a common-sense appraisal of the physical 
source itself, as well as of the taxpayer's interest in it, and 
any other relevant circumstances. The onus is on the taxpayer ... 
If the courts do adopt this "common-sense appraisal" it will be very 
unsatisfactory from the taxpayer's point of view, since it would be a 
highly subjective evaluation by the courts that would be very difficult 
to anticipate. Casey J. also leaves open the factors that can be taken 
into account. The result is that we have a very unhelpful test that has 
the possibility of widely varying conclusions. Nor does Casey J. 
51 (1975) 3 N.Z.T.C. 61, 208, 61, 216. 
52 Idem. 
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explain what he means by an "appraisal of the physical source itself". 
The reason why Casey J. and also Lord Diplock in Europa do not seem to 
give any helpful indication of what will constitute a new source of 
income stems from the fact that neither has given any explanation of 
why the distinction exists in the first place. The reason for the dis-
tinction, as has been shown earlier, is that there must be a situation 
existing before the arrangement is entered into which creates the 
potential tax liability, that is subsequently avoided by the arrange-
ment. Only once this is realised does it become clear what it is you 
are trying to ascertain by looking at the physical source of the income. 
What has to be established is whether the new arrangement is merely re-
directing the same source of income or whether it has made such funda-
mental changes that it must be considered a different income source, 
This line of inquiry, though making more sense of the test than Casey 
J. set out in Halliwell, does not make it any easier in knowing where 
the line will be drawn or what factors the court will regard as 
creating that fundamental change necessary to create a new source of 
income. 
The basis for Casey J' s decision that section 99 applied was that Mr 
Halliwell's interest in the partnership had not changed significantly. 
Implied in his judgement was that if Mr Halliwell's initial interest 
in the partnership had been much smaller changing to complete ownership 
then the new business would have been a new source of income and 
section 99 would not have applied to the deductions he claimed. 
That would not be a correct result however. On the facts of the case 
Mr Halliwell bought the partnership interest off his father first and 
then he sold the equipment to the family trust. Thus when Mr 
Halliwell sold the equipment to the trust he did have an existing source 
of income with a potential liability to pay tax on his new business 
interest. The new source argument should have been irrelevant in 
29 
Halliwell. For the new source argument to have been possible the partner-
ship would have to have sold the equipment to the family trust before Mr 
Halliwell bought his father's share in the partnership. 
Hartley claims that the Privy Council in Europa Oil(2) were wrong in 
their decision that there was a new source of income on the facts. He 
53 
claims: 
Whatever the merits of the "new" source argument are, in Europa 
Oil's case, there is a short answer. The Pan Eastern Benefit was 
not a "new" source at all ...• To exempt it on the "new" source 
argument is to overlook the fact that it was additional, but 
nevertheless part of Europa Oil's ordinary business operations. 
Europa Oil could not have obtained the Pan Eastern benefit had it 
not been in the business of buying petroleum products for retail in 
New Zealand. That benefit could never have stood alone as a source 
of income. It had to rest on Europa Oil's product purchases -
which Europa had been making for years - and therefore an 
addition to Europa's profit and not a new source of profit. 
This argument seems to misconstrue the Privy Council's decision. The 
Privy Council did not conclude that the Pan Eastern benefit was a new 
source of income independent from the profit earned from the petroleum 
purchased from Gulf. Lord Diplock stated:
54 
the 1956 organisation contract created a new source of income 
for the taxpayer company which did not exist before the 1956 
processing contract came into force. 
Hartley interprets this statement as meaning that the source created by 
the 1956 contracts was the Pan Eastern company. However the 1956 
53 "The Europa Oil(No.?}Case", supra n.50, 227. 
54 1}97£\ N.Z.L.R. 556, 557. 
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contracts involved more than just setting up the Pan Eastern company. 
Part of the 1956 contracts was the long term 'products contract' which 
secured the sale of oil from the Gulf to Europa Oil. What the Privy 
Council most probably was saying is that by changing suppliers from 
Caltex to Gulf (the 1956 contracts embodying that change), Europa Oil 
was creating a new source of income. The relevant source being the 
supplier, Gulf, not the Pan Eastern company. If Gulf was a new source 
the Pan Eastern benefit would have to be seen as coming from the new 
source and Europa Oil could not be taxed for it because it had never been 
received by Europa Oil as assessable income. There was no basis of com-
parison to treat it as anything other than a tax free dividend. There-
fore the statement by Lord Diplock is doing no more than stating that by 
changing suppliers, even if you are purchasing the same product, a 
taxpayer is creating a new source of income. 
The Australian decision of Mullens v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation55 
when applying the new source principle to section 260 adopted an 
extremely limited interpretation as to what would constitute an 
"existing" source of income. The court in Mullens was not concerned 
with a new source of income but with a new basis of deduction but found 
the new source principle relevant. A firm of stockbrokers had 
entered into an arrangement that enabled them to deduct the price they 
paid for some shares from their assessable income under a particular 
section of the Australian Act.
56 
Sir Barwick C.J. adopted the new 
57 source argument and stated: 
It seems to me that the parity of reasoningS. 260 may be said 
not to be concerned with the right to a deduction which the only 
55 (1976) 6 A.T.R. 504. 
56 Section 77A,which has since been repealed. 
57 (1976) 6 A.T.R. 504, 510. 
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relevant transaction between the parties would produce in the 
future ... Just as there must be income, not derived from the 
impugned transaction but derived from the antecedent transaction 
between the parties which, when that transaction is struck down, is 
exposed as producing assessible income, so in my opinion, in relation 
to a deduction, the avoidance of the transaction must disclose a 
transaction or situation which did not entitle the taxpayer to a 
deduction. 
The effect of this case is that unless an arrangement is a rearrangement 
of a pre-existing relationship between the parties, that arrangement will 
create a new source of income. This approach is unlikely to be adopted 
with relation to section 99. It is not necessary for there to have been 
an analogous earlier arrangement between the same parties to establish 
a potential liability to pay tax that has been avoided by the taxpayer. 
That potential liability could have been created from one source and have 
been redirected to a third party. Thus such an interpretation would be 
an unwarranted restriction on the words of section 99. 
The Court of Appeal case of Martin is an example where a New Zealand 
court has found a tax avoiding purpose under section 99 and where there 
was no antecedent transaction between the parties concerned. 
The reason why the Australian courts have adopted a more restrictive 
approach to new sources than the New Zealand courts can be explained by 
the different approach they take to their general anti-avoidance provision 
as a whole in its relationship to the rest of the Act. This is explained 
later in section VIII of the paper. 
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VI. T H E " C H O I C E p R I N C I p L E II 
Another aspect that the Legislature could so easily have resolved when 
redrafting section 99 was how it relates to other sections in the Act. 
That the Legislature did not is an unfortunate oversight and has 
resulted in conflicting opinions. 
The Australian courts have made it clear that section 260 has no operation 
where the arrangement comes within the ambit of another section of the 
Act. This is known as the "choice principle". Where the taxpayer chooses 
to bring his arrangement within another section of the Act that purports 
to regulate that particular transaction, then section 260 does not apply 
regardless of the purpose of that arrangement. 
58 This principle was first established in W.P.Keighery Pty v F.C.T. 
The rationale behind the choice principle is well explained by Cribb J. 
59 in Patcorp Investments Ltd. v F.C.T. His Honour explained that:
60 
The presence of section 260 makes it impossible to place upon other 
provisions of the Act a qualification which they do not express, 
for the purpose of inhibiting tax avoidance. In other words it is 
not permissible to make an application which does what section 260 
fails to do in preventing the avoidance of tax. If it is 
suggested that a taxpayer has engaged in a device to secure a 
fiscal advantage, and the relevant provisions of the Act do not 
expressly deal with the matter, the case depends entirely on 
section 260. 
In New Zealand the situation is far from clear. In McKay, the Court of 
Appeal considered the relationship between section 96 and section 99. 
Section 96 governs the transfer of rights to income and sets out certain 
58 (1957) 100 C.L.R. 66. 
59 (1976) 6 A.T.R. 420. 
60 Ibid, 429. 
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criteria which need to be met. If they are not, the section deems that 
the income is derived by the transferor and not the transferee. 
The Court of Appeal found that section 99 would not normally apply if 
the person transferring the right to income complies with the require-
61 ments in the section but went on to qualify this by stating: 
But lyection 9§] certainly does not prevent the Commissioner, in 
the proper case, from applying to such assignments the provisions 
of ~ection 9~ . 
The court made no reference to what would constitute a "proper case". 
It is apparent, though, that the Court of Appeal did not regard section 
99 as automatically restricted by the application of section 96. 
Molloy states that the test should be that, where there had been a 
"simple" use of a section of the Act by the taxpayer, where the tax-
payer was merely pursuing an alternative choice open to him by the Act 
62 itself, section 99 does not apply. But '~here the choice does not 
stand alone, but is part of a wider arrangement, it will fall with that 
63 arrangement". 
However, the decision in McKay may have been overruled by necessary 
implication by the Privy Council's decision in Europa(2). This will be 
considered later on. Most of the cases in New Zealand that have 
relevance to the "choice principle", are concerned with the relationship 
between section 99 and section 104. Section 104 allows a taxpayer to 
deduct from his total income for the year any expenditure or loss 
incurred in producing his income. The main Australian case regarding 
61 J.97~ N.Z.L.R. 592, Per Turner J, 600. 
62 "Recent Tax Developments - The Scope of Section 108" ( 19 76) 
Recent Law, 289. 
63 Ibid 290. 
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the relationship between section 260 and section 51, the Australian 
64 equivalent to section 104, is Cecil Bros. Pty Ltd. v F.C.T. 
the "choice principle". 65 Dixon C.J. stated: 
Adopting 
I have great difficulty in seeing how ~ection 26QJ could apply to 
defeat or reduce any deduction otherwise truly allowable under 
s. 51. 
Dixon C.J. gave no explanation for this comment and there seems to be no 
particular reason why section 51 should exclude the operation of section 
260 if the deduction is found to be part of a tax avoiding arrangement. 
The decision in Cecil Bros. was accepted in the subsequent decision of 
66 Franklyn's Self Service Pty Ltd v F.C.T. But in the case of Hooker-
67 Rex Pty Ltd v F.C.T. decided in the same year, Menzies J. suggested 
that section 260 was able to avoid a deduction even if it was a valid 
deduction under section 51 where the deduction was not an ordinary 
business dealing. 
The New Zealand courts have been similarly inconsistent in their approach. 
In Elmiger Woodhouse J. disagreed with the conclusion of Dixon C.J. pre-
68 £erring to follow dictum from the case of Jaques v F.C. of T. where 
Rich J. said: 69 
64. (1964) 111 C.L.R. 430. 
65. Ibid, 438. 
66. (1970) I.A.T.R. 673. 
67. (19 70) I.A.T.R. 642. 
68. (1924) 34 C.L.R. 328. 
69. Ibid, 338. 
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The Legislature has permitted the deduction where it is the 
legitimate result of a call arising from the ordinary situation 
of a shareholder in a mining company. But ~ection 26[) in my 
opinion also excludes a deduction which is not the result but the 
animated purpose of a call deliberately incurred, as this as, for 
the purpose of the deduction. 
Woodhouse J. applied this reasoning to section 99 and concluded: 70 
The question is not whether arrangements which promote deductions 
can fall within the ambit of the section; but whether, having so 
fallen, the section can then be applied in order to justify a 
reassessment of income tax. 
The Court of Appeal in Europa Oil (1) 
71 
however, accepted the conclusion 
of Dixon J. in Cecil Bras and affirmed that section 99 had no applica-
tion at all to deductions which a taxpayer is entitled to claim under 
section 104. 
72 
This point was not decided when the case was on appeal 
to the Privy Council. Lord Wilberforce for the majority decided that 
the deduction was not permissible under section 104 and preferred not to 
express an opinion on whether section 99 could have applied if it had 
been an allowable deduction. 
In Mangin the Privy Council was concerned with an arrangement whereby a 
taxpayer sold farm equipment to a family trust and leased it back claim-
ing a deduction for the leasing cost against the income he earned. The 
Privy Council avoided the arrangement under section 99 without even 
addressing themselves to the problem of the relationship between section 
99 and section 104. However the decision in Mangin "necessarily implies 
f . 104" 
73 rejection of the primacy o section . 
70 [196~ N.Z.L.R. 683, 693. 
71 1} 9 79] N. Z. L. R. 36 3. 
72 Per North P. and Turner J. 389, 414. 
73 Basset "Estate plans and arrangements to avoid income tax" Supra n.18,620. 
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The Court of Appeal in Wisheart expressly rejected the approach taken in 
Cecil Bros. The decisions of North P. and Turner J. make no reference to 
the fact that they are taking a totally contrary view to that which they 
expressed in Europa(!). 
Up to this point there is strong authority for the view that Malloy takes 
with regard to deductions claimed under section 104 which reduce a tax-
74 payer's incidence of tax. He states that the taxpayer has expressly 
been given the choice as to how to arrange his affairs by the Act. If 
he arranges his affairs so as to create a deduction that reduces the tax 
he pays, then that is a simple exercise of that choice which cannot 
normally be classified as tax avoidance. Section 99 does however have 
effect when the creation of a deduction goes beyond merely taking 
advantage of the option allowed by the Act. As he explains: 
75 
... the line between a mere tax advantage, in this sense, and "tax 
avoidance" in the sense contemplated by ~section 99] is crossed at 
the point where such a transaction takes place, not in isolation, 
but in the wider context of an arrangement aimed at splitting 
the business income with a purchaser who is an associate, a 
relative, or a trustee for a relative; who is not going to put up 
cash to free the capital locked up in the asset, but merely is 
agreeing to pay the purchase price on demand, with the idea that 
it will either be paid out of income derived from the vendor's 
rent, or will be forgiven by the vendor in instalments. 
This approach is also consistent with the actual words used in the 
sections. The right to claim a deduction under section 104 is expressly 
restricted by the words "except as otherwise provided for by the Act". 
74 
75 
"Malloy on Income Tax", Supra n.39, 620. 
Idem. 
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section 99 applies to "Every Arrangement". Not allowing section 99 to 
operate when a deduction is allowable under section 104 is to reject a 
literal interpretation of the words. This approach suggested by Malloy 
is also consistent with the approach taken in McKay as to the relation-
ship between section 99 and section 96. This would appear to be the most 
logical interpretation with regards to the extent of section 99. 
But the Privy Council's decision in Europa(2) creates an enormous 
obstacle in adopting such an interpretation. Their Lordships were 
obliged to decide on the relationship between section 99 and section 104 
since they had previously found that the deduction in consideration was 
a legitimate deduction under section 104. 
Lord Diplock giving the decision of the majority stated:
76 
Their Lordships' finding that the monies paid by the taxpayer com-
pany to Europa Refining is deductible under Tu_ection 10J as being 
the actual price paid by the taxpayer company for its stock-in-
trade under contracts for the sale of goods entered into with 
Europa Refining, is incompatible with those contracts being liable 
to avoidance under ~ection 99]. 
Lord Diplock gives absolutely no explanation for this statement and it 
is very unclear as to what he considers gives rise to this incompatibility 
between section 99 and section 104. Was it because the two are inherently 
incompatible because Lord Diplock took the same view as that in Cecil Bros.? 
Alternatively, did Lord Diplock regard the application of section 99 as 
incompatible on the particular facts of the case? Bassett claims that 
the latter explanation is appropriate. 
(20) 77 He suggests: 
76 G97~ N.Z.L.R. 546, 556. 
77 "Estate plans and arrangements to avoid Income Tax", Supra N.18, 
35. 
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... that the way open to interpret the opinion of the Board is to hold 
that the view of their Lordships was directed to the facts of that 
particular case. Hence the "incompatibility" spoken of by the 
Board may be said to be occasioned by the present matter being a 
case of "expenditure genuinely made" [!he test propounded by 
the majority in Europa(l) for applying section 104l , in which case 
that characteristic would make the transaction a matter of ordinary 
business dealing and therefore necessarily safe from impeachment 
under section 99. 
This explanation does not however restrict the decision of Europa(2) to 
its facts in any way. Any expenditure must be genuinely made to fall 
within section 104. Thus if all expenditure genuinely made is necess-
arily an ordinary business dealing then section 99 would have no effect 
over any deduction once it is regarded as an acceptable deduction for the 
purposes of section 104. 
The point Bassett seems to miss is that the court is involved in two 
different enquiries when it is considering section 99 and section 104. 
In respect of section 104, the court is looking only at the particular 
expenditure; at what was paid and what was received and whether what 
was paid was in actual fact paid for what was received. This is clear 
in both Europa(l) and Europa(2). In Europa(l) Lord Wilberforce stated:
78 
For a claim to disallow a portion of expenditure incurred in 
purchasing trading stock to succeed the Crown, in their Lordships' 
judgement, must show that, as part of the contractual arrangement 
under which the stock was acquired some advantage, not identifiable 
as, or related to the production of, assessable income was gained, 
so that a part of the expenditure, which can be segregated and 
quantified, ought to be considered as consideration given for the 
advantage. 
78 ~97i) N.Z.L.R. 641. 
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Lord Wilberforce elaborated on this statement in his dissenting judgement 
in Europa(2); where he stated that what the court is concerned with when 
applying section 104 is: 79 
What was the expenditure for? What was it intended to gain? What 
did it gain? What elements entered into the fixing and acceptance 
of it? 
In Europa(2) the Privy Council adopted an even narrower test asking what 
the legal effect of the expenditure was; what the expenditure entitled 
the taxpayer to as performance of the contract. In both cases the Privy 
Council was concerned only with the actual expenditure and not with the 
wider question of why the expenditure was created. Section 99 on the 
other hand is concerned with this wider question of whether the expendi-
ture was created so as to avoid tax, and looks beyond the actual 
expenditure to the relationship between the parties before the expendi-
ture was made. It must be an expenditure within a wider arrangement to 
be able to fall within section 99. The Privy Council in Europa(2) was 
looking only at the actual expenditure and not at the wider relationship. 
The Privy Council, therefore, could not be interpreted as deciding that 
the deduction was not caught since it was an ordinary business dealing 
in terms of section 99. The Privy Council also cites Cecil Bros. as 
h . f i d . . . h k . · 11 80 aut ority or ts ecision wit out ma ing any reservations at a . 
Thus Casey J. would appear to be correct when he states his view about 
the decision in Europa(2). He stated in Halliwell:
81 
... the majority were expressing a general principle about the 
relation of f,ection 9![} to ~ection 10~ , and not merely con-
fining themselves to a finding on the specific facts before them, ... 
79 Ll-97~ N.Z.L.R. 546, 561. 
80 Ibid, 552. 
81 (1977) 3 N.Z.T.C. 61, 208, 61, 214. 
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The result is that Europa(2) constitutes a departure from both the 
literal effect of the words of section 99 and from well established 
authority. However, Casey J. did not leave the matter there, he went on 
to distinguish Europa(2) and hold that section 99 does have some 
application to deductions that are acceptable for the purposes of section 
104. 82 He claimed: 
Where the need for the expenditure can be regarded as a normal 
incident of the business or undertaking forming the source of the 
taxpayer's income, then he may select his own means of incurring 
it, and may spend what he thinks fit. So long as the expenditure 
conforms with ~ection 10':Q , it cannot be attacked under 
section 99 • But ~ection 991 can still apply where the need for 
such expenditure has been contrived in any existing source of in-
come, as part of arrangement having tax avoidance as one of its 
main purposes, and which is not a usual business or family 
dealing. 
As J. Prebble points out, Casey J. is blending the two separate tests in 
Europa(2); the new sources argument and the statement that allowing a 
deduction under section 104 is 'incompatible' with a claim that the 
d b · d d d . 99 83 de uction can e avoi e un er section . Put simply the result of 
84 the test propounded by Casey J. would be that: 
deductions conforming with ~ection 10J will be safe, but 
only if they are in respect of new sources of income or, one 
assumes by parity of reasoning, in respect of expenditure. 
On examination, the decision in Halliwell is incorrectly decided, Casey J. 
82 Ibid, 615. 
83 "Tax avoiding arrangements that comply with Section 104, Income 
Tax Act 1976" Vol.8, N.Z.L.L.R. 70. 
84 Ibid, 72. 
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is not able to distinguish Europa(2) on the grounds that Halliwell con-
cerns existing income. The Privy Council made a series of separate 
statements; two of them being: 
a) that section 99 does not apply to new source income. 
b) that the application of section 99 to avoid deductions is incompat-
ible with allowing those deductions under section 104. 
There is no justification for connecting these statements to form his 
hybrid test. In the situation of new source income, the question of 
compatibility between section 99 and section 104 does not arise. 
Section 99 just does not apply whether the deduction falls within 
section 104 or not. By using the term "incompatibility", the Privy 
Council must surely have been considering a situation where both 
sections had the potential to apply. That situation had to involve an 
existing source of income. 
What the test of Casey J. does do is to acknowledge that section 104 and 
section 99 are directed at different issues. By stating that section 99 
can apply when an allowable deduction is "continued", Casey J. is look-
ing at the wider question of how the deduction came into being. This 
approach is moving back to the situation accepted in Mangin and Wisheart. 
Europa(2) must be seen as an endorsement of the Cecil Bros. approach 
which is not concerned with the wider issue involved in section 99. By 
choosing to create a deduction that falls within section 104, the tax-
Y payer eliminates the operation of section 99. This approach is difficult 
to accept in logic when it is apparent that the two sections ask funda-
mentally different questions. 
,t 
Although Europa(2) is concerned with the relationship between section 99 
and section 104, the decision may extend generally to the application of 
section 99 to arrangements that fall within other sections of the Act. 
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Thus it could overrule the decision in McKay with respect to the relation-
ship between section 99 and section 96 . 
But as Hartley explains, there is a fundamental difference in principle 
between applying section 99 to section 104, and to section 96. 
85 Section 96 cannot be seen as a self sufficient provision. "It 
effectively tells a taxpayer what he cannot do. It does not 'allow' 
86 anything." 
85 Settlements of property for tax purposes. LLM Thesis, V,U,W. (1976) 
Para. 4-10. 
86 Idem. 
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VIII. THE EXTENT OF THE CHOICE PRINCIPLE 
If Europa(2) is interpreted as adopting the choice principle as accepted 
in Keighery and Cecil Bros. the exact application and extent of this 
principle assumes great importance. 
The Australian courts have taken a very generous view of the choice 
principle and by doing so have given their section 260 an extremely 
87 limited application. In Slutzkin v F.C.T. the court held that the 
choice principle applied not only where the Act specifically gave the 
taxpayer a choice to bring himself within a particular section of the 
Act but also where the taxpayer is given a choice by the general 
scheme of the Act. 
Aitken J. outlined the principle as follows:
88 
To adopt a course which produces a result outside the scope of the 
Act is not to alter the incidence of tax, or to defeat any liab-
ility to tax or to prevent the operation of the Act, notwith-
standing that such a course is adopted with full knowledge of the 
provisions of the Act and with a conscious intention that the 
proceeds should not fall within the operation of the Act. 
Similarly Barwick C.J. stated:
89 
... the choice of the form of transaction by which a taxpayer 
obtains the benefit of his assets is a matter for him; he is quite 
entitled to choose that form of transaction which will not subject 
him to tax, or subject him to less tax than some other form of 
transaction might do. 
87 (1977) 7 A.T,R, 166, 
88 Ibid, 174. 
89 Ibid~ 169. 
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The effect of the decision is Slutzkin in Australia is outlined by 
Spry. He states:
90 
... It appears that almost invariably when section 260 is attempted 
to be invoked by the Commissioner it will be held that no improper 
"avoidance" of a liability has taken place, nor an improper 
alteration of the incidence of tax, since the Act must be taken 
to contemplate that what has been done to the parties to the 
relevant arrangement should be open to them; and the incidence 
of tax that the Act contemplates in those circumstances must be the 
incidence that arises on the basis that the transaction has been 
carried out. 
The only exception will be the one established in Mullens case where there 
has been an analogous earlier transaction which establishes a liability 
that was subsequently avoided. 
This extremely narrow view of the concept of avoidance is not a necess-
ary extension of the choice principle as set out in Keighery and Cecil 
Bros. It goes further than deciding which of two sections prevail over 
the other. Bassett points out that this extension of the principle in 
Slutzkin involves a particular conception of what constitutes tax 
avoidance which is based outside the actual provisions of the Act: 
[!'hii] aspect, propounded in Slutzkin, is essentially rooted in 
the concept of laissez-faire though it also involves a value 
judgment as to the perceived extent of the tax base. 
This approach would make the "ordinary family or business dealings test" 
redundant. It is probably unlikely that the New Zealand courts will 
adopt the approach taken in Slutzkin. It is certainly not a necessary 
90 "Section 260 ·of the Income Tax Assessment Act", Supra n.38. 
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extension of the choice principle as originally established, and our 
courts have shown that they take a different approach to the extent to 
which a taxpayer can arrange his affairs with impunity. The courts 
have recognised that there are interests other than the taxpayer's to 
be considered and that there is a social obligation to pay a certain 
amount of tax. Slutzkin relies on the famous dicta in Inland Revenue 
Commissioners v Duke of Westminster
91 
to justify their conclusion. In 
that case Lord Tomlin stated:
92 
Every man is entitled, if he can, to order his affairs so that the 
tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise 
would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this 
result, then however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue or his fellow taxpayer may be of his ingenuity, he cannot 
be compelled to pay an increased tax. 
Woodhouse J. considered this dictum in Elmiger and stated: 93 
I naturally appreciate that this forceful argument has the 
support of the highest authority. And I well recognise that the 
courts will always be careful to protect citizens against any 
demands of the Revenue which cannot be supported by some statutory 
provision. Nevertheless, since the House of Lords was obliged to 
consider the highly beneficial arrangements which were able to be 
made in 1930 on behalf of the Duke of Westminster, there has been 
a growing awareness by the Legislature and the Courts alike that 
ingenious legal devices contrived to enable individual taxpayers 
to minimise or avoid their tax liabilities are often not merely 
sterile or unproductive in themselves (except perhaps in respect 
of their tax advantages for the taxpayer concerned), but that 
9 1 IT 9 3~ A • C • 1. 
92 Ibid, 19. 
93 [96~ N.Z.L.R. 683, 686. 
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they have social consequences which are contrary to the general 
public interest. 
This passage indicates that the New Zealand courts have taken a different 
approach to determining the scheme of the Act. There is also very 
recent authority in support of the courts reading down the decision 
of Duke of Westminster as Woodhouse J. has done. The House of Lords 
in J.W.Ramsey Ltd v IRCs; 94 Elibeck (Inspector of Taxes) v Rawling 
places their previous decision of Duke of Westminster in context. Lord 
Wilberforce stated: 95 
Given that a document or transaction is genuine,the court cannot 
go behind it to some supposed underlying substance. This is the 
well-known principle of Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke of 
Westminster ... This is a cardinal principle but it must not be 
overstated or over-extended. While obliging the court to accept 
documents or transactions, found to be genuine, as such, it does 
not compel the court to look at a document or a transaction in 
blinkers, isolated from any context to which it properly belongs. 
If it can be seen that a document or transaction was intended to 
have effect as part of a nexus or series of transactions, or as 
an ingredient of a wider transaction intended as a whole, there 
is nothing in the doctrine to prevent it being so regarded; to do 
so is not to prefer form to substance, or substance to form. It 
is the task of the court to ascertain the legal nature of any 
transactions to which it is sought to attach a tax or a tax con-
sequence and if that emerges from a series or combination of 
transactions, intended to operate as such, it is that series or 
combination which may be regarded. 
94 [}98!] 1 ALL E. R. 865. 
95 Ibid, 871. 
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There is, then, no necessity for the New Zealand courts to adopt the 
approach taken in Slutzkin and there is absolutely no indication in 
the cases that they intend to. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
Section 99 appears at first glance to make significant changes to its 
predecessor. It seems more detailed, more comprehensive and more 
precise. When it is subject to closer scrutiny, however, the section 
fulfils none of these preliminary expectations. Section 99 in fact has 
to be regarded as a failure as an exercise in legislative arfting. 
The section fails to correct all but one of the criticisms directed at 
section 108 by Lord Wilberforce
96
. The section now does provide for 
reconstructing arrangements once they are avoided. This provision does 
eliminate a serious limitation which existed before. But that correction 
is basically an improvement in the mechanics of the section. It in no 
way helps in trying to understand when the section actually applies. 
There is still no helpful concept of what constitutes tax avoidance. This 
failure ensures that uncertainty about the section will still exist. The 
new definitions add nothing to the clarity of the section in this regard. 
As a result the courts are going to be forced to look beycnd the Act to 
establish a notion of tax avoidance. This will necessarily require the 
courts placing glosses on the words of the section. 
The history of cases concerning section 108 has shown the difficulty and 
uncertainty of trying to establish a test that helps ascertain the 
purpose of an arrangement. The "ordinary business and family dealings" 
test which the courts adopted will probably be the one they have to rely 
on again to give the section any sensible meaning. It is a test that has 
been widely recognised as deficient and one which will not enable a 
taxpayer to know, with any degree of certainty, what his tax liability is. 
There is confusion as to what may be taken into account to determine the 
purpose of an arrangement. There is confusion as to how precisely you 
determine the purpose of an arrangement. 
96 Mangin IT97i] N.Z.L.R. 591, 602. These are outlined in the 
Introduction. 
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The section does not clearly explain its limits. It does not state 
whether "potential liability" involves liability for potential income 
from a potential source or whether it is restricted to potential income 
from a source that is already established. Of greater concern, the 
section does not explain the relationship of the section with other 
sections of the Act. 
Section 99 is clearly going to be the subject of litigation in the 
courts for some time to come. Some of the confusion in the cases will 
be able to be resolved by the courts, but there will always be a degree 
of uncertainty as to the exact application of the section due to the 
vagueness inherent in the concepts of "tax avoidance" and "ordinary 
business or family dealing". 
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